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It Was Here a Second Ago: North Carolina
Discovery and Ephemeral Messaging Apps
BY: JOSHUA WALTHALL*
ABSTRACT
Ephemeral messaging apps allow users to send and receive text
messages that disappear after being read. How might such technology
impact the practice of law, especially as it concerns discovery? This Article
defines ephemeral messaging apps, reviews recent discovery litigation in
North Carolina for possible points of application with ephemeral
messaging apps, and analyzes the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
and the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct in light of ephemeral
messaging apps. This Article also examines how other, out-of-state courts
have dealt with ephemeral messaging apps in the context of discovery and
makes some practical suggestions on what North Carolina courts might or
should do when faced with ephemeral messaging apps and their use by
attorneys or litigants in North Carolina.

*

Walthall is a lawyer and adjunct professor in Raleigh, N.C. He is particularly grateful to
Jeff Kelly, as fine a civil litigator as you're likely to meet, for guidance on this topic. He is
also deeply indebted to the exceptional research and writing assistance of Laurel Christmas
and Lauren Johnson in the drafting of this article. All mistakes and boring portions are the
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BOTH FRIEND AND ENEMY: AN INTRODUCTION
Neil Postman describes technology as “both friend and enemy,”1 “both
a burden and a blessing.”2 Objectively, this rings true. Anyone who
attempted to drive a car to an unfamiliar location before the advent of global
positioning systems and downloadable celebrity voices instructing us when
to “take a left in half a mile” can attest to the blessings of technology. And
anyone who has attempted to have a meaningful or cogent conversation with
a teenager holding a smart phone can likely swear to technology’s burden—
as could any attorney forced to respond to a client’s text message at 11:37
p.m. on a Tuesday.
What is undeniable, though, is that technology is here to stay,
demanding we use it and taking captive our time and attention, for better or
worse. “Copious studies show a reduced amount of leisure time
experienced by modern families, more time in front of the TV and the
computer, and growing obesity among adults and children because of diet
and sedentary lifestyles.”3 For old dogs and Luddites, the proliferation of
technology presents more burden than boon. But digital natives likely see
only blessings or friends in the ever-present screens in their offices,
bedrooms, cars, kitchens, and pockets.
Today’s students – K through college – represent the first generations to
grow up with this new technology. They have spent their entire lives
surrounded by and using computers, videogames, digital music players,
video cams, cell phones, and all the other toys and tools of the digital age.
Today’s average college grads have spent less than 5,000 hours of their lives
reading, but over 10,000 hours playing video games (not to mention 20,000
hours watching TV). Computer games, email, the Internet, cell phones and
instant messaging are integral parts of their lives.4

In the world of law, the blessing-and-curse nature of technology—and
the dichotomy with which its users respond to it—evidences itself not just
in how digital natives and digital immigrants use their time, interact with
each other, and bill hours, but it rears its head in more formalized
communications as well. For a significant portion of lawyers in the United
States, emails seem to have largely replaced hardcopy letters, even in formal
1. NEIL POSTMAN, TECHNOPOLY: THE SURRENDER OF CULTURE TO TECHNOLOGY, at xii
(Vintage Books 1993) (1992).
2. Id. at 5.
3. RICHARD LOUV, LAST CHILD IN THE WOODS 31–32 (rev. and updated ed. 2008).
4. Marc Prensky, Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants, 9 ON HORIZON, no. 5, Oct. 2001,
at 1.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2021

3

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 7

480

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:477

legal communications; others, though, still swear by the thick and oily
cardstock of a hardcopy letter, signed in majestic hand.
Notable differences in discovery approaches also exist in the
profession; in just the last few years “e-discovery” became, if not a
household word, one regularly on the lips of all but the luckiest civil
litigators.5 And as any first-year law student can attest, the Rules governing
discovery are legion6—and often confusing.
To complicate matters even more, technology, as we all know, is not
static. Inventors, engineers, and entrepreneurs create new platforms,
websites, and “apps,” common vernacular for “applications,” every day;
and the world of law—specifically, the world of discovery—enjoys no
immunity from this constant evolution. What happens when these
inevitable and relentless advances in technology outrun the rules governing
lawyers, be they the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure or the North
Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct? Well, overlong law review
articles that get written by dodgy law school professors perhaps provide as
honest an answer as any. This is the situation before us at present:
ephemeral messaging apps have arrived on the scene, so lawyers and
litigants must figure out how the legal and ethical standards govern the apps,
their use, and the attorneys and litigants who utilize them. “For it is
inescapable that every culture must negotiate with technology, whether it
does so intelligently or not.”7
This Article will (I) introduce the blissfully uninitiated—be you digital
native or digital immigrant—to ephemeral messaging apps; (II) review
recent discovery litigation in North Carolina, paying particular attention to
discovery violations, document preservation, spoliation, and sanctions, with
an eye toward how North Carolina courts might handle ephemeral
messaging apps; (III) analyze the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
and the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct for possible points of
intersection with this new technology; (IV) examine how other, out-of-state
courts have dealt with ephemeral messaging apps in the context of
discovery; and finally, (V) make some practical suggestions on what North
Carolina courts might or should do when faced with ephemeral messaging
apps and their use by attorneys or litigants in this state.
5. See Lucas Newcomer & Johnny Lee, E-Discovery Challenges and Information
Governance Solutions, A.B.A. (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigati
on/committees/pretrial-practice-discovery/articles/2019/winter2019-e-discovery-challenges
-and-information-governance-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/V3C3-S7JW] (“Over 90 percent
of the data in the world today has been created within the past two years, and the number
and variety of data sources that an organization must manage continues to grow.”).
6. See generally FED. R. CIV. P.; N.C. R. CIV. P.
7. POSTMAN, supra note 1, at 5.
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I. NEWFANGLED TECHNOBABBLE: WHAT ARE EPHEMERAL MESSAGING
APPS?
What are ephemeral messaging apps and how are they used? Perhaps
only a fool risks summarizing new technology in a medium such as this.
Undoubtedly it risks information technology professionals—or perhaps just
any digital native—finding it overly simplistic and wanting, while at the
same time threatening to be too confusing for digital immigrants. In an
effort to strike a balance somewhere in between, the below summary is by
no means exhaustive, but merely an effort at a brief explanation that most
folks, be they digital natives or digital immigrants, can hopefully
understand.
An ephemeral messaging app is a communication platform that allows
one user to send to another user an electronic message, similar to an email
or text message, that will automatically disappear directly after the recipient
views it. Ephemeral messaging apps “are now widely available on a host
of platforms, including enterprise software such as Slack or DingTalk.
Although each application is slightly different, they all incorporate some
type of trigger that automatically deletes messages shortly after viewing and
prevents users from editing, copying, forwarding or printing the
messages.”8 Such apps are lauded by “privacy advocates”9 and are
becoming increasingly available, especially in the context of litigants and
those subject to discovery:
Time-limited messaging, after all, can stifle the best laid e-discovery plans
or the most thoroughly conducted investigation. And they’re not going
away anytime soon. Once only the focus of a handful of messaging apps,
ephemeral messages are now being offered by widely used services like
Gmail and Facebook.10

Typically, messages sent through ephemeral messaging apps are not
even captured or saved on a server. Messages sent and received via an
ephemeral messaging app “create the digital facsimile of an in-person

8. William Semins et al., The Compliance Risks Facing Companies That Use Chat
Apps, LAW360 (June 16, 2020, 4:38 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1282305/thecompliance-risks-facing-companies-that-use-chat-apps [https://perma.cc/4QW2-T376].
9. Rhys Dipshan, This Article Will Self-Destruct: Behind Ephemeral Messaging’s
In-House Rise, LAW.COM: LEGALTECH NEWS (June 13, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.law.c
om/legaltechnews/2019/06/13/this-article-will-self-destruct-behind-ephemeral-messagingsin-house-rise/ [https://perma.cc/RFZ4-4FD9] (follow “Go to Lexis Advance®” or “Go to
Bloomberg Law” hyperlink to access archived content).
10. Id.
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meeting or a telephone call by deleting or otherwise destroying a message
shortly after it has been read or opened by its recipient(s).”11 The apps
themselves “are often peer-to-peer, which eliminates servers in between the
sender and recipient that could potentially be used to capture the
communication. These layers of security make retrieval or reproduction of
such messages nearly impossible.”12
For digital natives, the preceding paragraph, what with its references
to servers and digital facsimiles, is probably as easy to read as a bowling
alley lunch menu and requires no further explanation. Digital immigrants
like the undersigned author, though, require some expert help. A server is
essentially a central storage system through which a company’s emails
travel before being sent to the recipient: “Generally, in a business
organization, email systems use a central computer (sometimes the server)
to store messages and data and to send them to the appropriate destination.
All that is needed to send messages is a PC, modem, and email
connection.”13 Emails sent through a regular channel are often captured on
a server and, even when deleted from the email recipient’s inbox, can be
retrieved by someone searching or accessing the server. “Deleted emails
are, in most cases, not irretrievably lost. Deleted emails may remain on a
computer hard drive, servers or retained on back-up tapes.”14
Think of it this way: if an email is a hardcopy letter, the email
recipient’s inbox is her hands, and the server is the waste bin in which she
tosses the note after she has read it. Even if she throws the note away, into
the bin, the note still exists and can be accessed and read later. To
completely eradicate the note, the recipient would need to remove it from
the bin and burn it. In much the same way, the recipient of an email cannot
eradicate it simply by deleting the email from his inbox; it will still exist on
a server and can be searched for, found, and produced in discovery later.
Messages sent via ephemeral messaging apps, however, are not kept on a
server, so when they disappear, they cannot be accessed again, even by the
sender or the recipient.15
The interface, methods, and use of ephemeral messaging apps vary
from platform to platform, but many are akin to instant messaging
applications popularized in the early dawn of the internet and known even
amongst some digital immigrants: America Online Instant Messenger and

11. Semins et al., supra note 8.
12. Id.
13. MICHAEL R. ARKFELD, Structure and Type of Electronic Information, in ARKFELD
ON ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND EVIDENCE § 3.9 (2020).
14. Id.
15. See Semins et al., supra note 8.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol43/iss3/7

6

Walthall: It Was Here a Second Ago: North Carolina Discovery andEphemeral M

2021]

IT WAS HERE A SECOND AGO

483

Google Chat. Once again, an example may help illustrate how ephemeral
messaging apps are used. An ephemeral messaging app user, Woodrow,
pulls out his mobile phone and initiates a “chat” with another user,
Augustus. Woodrow types text into the app and sends it to Augustus in the
platform, not unlike a text message. Augustus reads the message on his
mobile phone and then it disappears, never touching a server or being stored
in any way and thus not saved or accessible anywhere. Augustus can then
send a text message back to Woodrow in the app, and vice versa, the process
of typing, sending, receiving, and disappearing repeated as many times as
the parties wish.
That, in short form, is what ephemeral messaging apps are:
disappearing text messages that vanish shortly after they are read by the
recipient. As mentioned, this summary does not plumb the depths of the
technology; certain aspects of the various applications are not explained in
absolute detail, but for our purposes, they need not be. Let us now set aside
these strange new apps and consider, non-exhaustively and only by way of
example, recent discovery litigation in North Carolina so that we can
thereafter look at how courts might examine ephemeral messaging apps and
their use by attorneys and litigants in The Old North State.
II. WHAT HAD HAPPENED WAS: RECENT DISCOVERY LITIGATION IN
NORTH CAROLINA
Once again, the recent cases listed below are not intended to be
exhaustive of all discovery litigation in North Carolina, nor is the summary
an opus on the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure; such a tome already
exists and cannot be improved upon.16 The below exists here only to
provide us with a framework through which we can consider ephemeral
messaging apps in light of the laws of North Carolina.
A. Crosmun v. Trustees of Fayetteville Technical Community College
In Crosmun, the North Carolina Court of Appeals faced its “first
opportunity to address the contours of eDiscovery within the context of
North Carolina common and statutory law regarding the attorney-client
privilege and work-product doctrine.”17 In Crosmun, former employees of
Fayetteville Technical Community College sued the school, “alleging
retaliatory dismissals . . . in violation of the North Carolina Whistleblower

16. See G. GRAY WILSON, NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE (3rd ed. 2007).
17. Crosmun v. Trs. of Fayetteville Tech. Cmty. Coll., 832 S.E.2d 223, 228 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2019).
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Protection Act.”18 The plaintiffs served the defendants with three sets of
interrogatories and requests for production, seeking electronically stored
information retained in the school’s computers and servers.19 The trial court
entered both an order compelling discovery and an order providing that a
computer forensic expert would conduct a forensic examination of the
defendants’ computer files.20 The defendants appealed from this order and
contended that the order amounted to an involuntary waiver of their
attorney–client privilege and the work-product doctrine.21
On appeal, the court acknowledged the necessity of the forensic
examination order but identified two reasons for vacating the discovery
order.22 The court then advised, first, that an independent expert needed to
perform the forensic examination to protect confidentiality, and, second,
that the responding party should have an opportunity to review the keyword
search used in the forensic examination prior to production of responsive
electronically stored information to the opposing party.23
In analyzing the broader contours of e-discovery, the court
“consider[ed] decisions of courts in other jurisdictions.”24 The court stated
that forensic examinations of electronically stored information “may be
warranted when there exists some factual basis to conclude that the
responding party has not met its duties in the production of discoverable
information.”25 But even when a forensic examination is appropriate, “any
protocol ordered must take into account privileges from production that
have not been waived or otherwise lost.”26 The court noted that, in ordering
forensic examinations, courts should be mindful of: a) disclosing trade
secrets; b) disclosing confidential or private information; c) disclosing
“confidential attorney–client or work-product communications”; d)
“unreasonably disrupting the ongoing business”; e) “endangering the

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 229.
21. Id. at 228.
22. Id. at 236–37 (identifying error in allowing plaintiffs’ expert, “rather than an
independent third party, the authority to directly access and image the entirety of Defendants’
computer systems absent regard for Defendants’ privilege,” and in “the delivery of
responsive documents to Plaintiffs without allowing Defendants an opportunity to review
them for privilege”).
23. Id. at 240.
24. Id. at 233.
25. Id. at 234 (citing Feeassco, LLC v. Steel Network, Inc., 826 S.E.2d 202, 209 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2019)).
26. Id.
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stability of operating systems” or files; and f) “placing a responding party’s
computing systems at risk of a data security breach.”27
B. Tumlin v. Tuggle Duggins P.A.
In Tumlin, a North Carolina Business Court case, the plaintiff moved
for discovery sanctions against the defendant, asserting that the defendant
violated Rules 26(g) and 37(b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure.28 The plaintiff asked the court to order a forensic examination
of the defendant’s email server, at the defendant’s expense, “to determine if
potentially relevant e-mails were lost because of [the defendant’s] failure to
adequately preserve documents.”29 The document request at issue sought
the production of “emails . . . in [the defendant’s] possession or
control . . . regarding or pertaining to plaintiff’s departure from the
defendant [law firm] and/or relating to plaintiff’s compensation.”30 The
defendant law firm diligently searched its email server numerous times and
produced responsive, non-privileged emails when appropriate.31
The plaintiff’s motion asserted four separate contentions: (1) the
defendant violated Rule 26(g) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure; (2) the defendant “failed to conduct reasonable searches and
effectively manage e-discovery”; (3) the defendant “failed to provide [the
plaintiff] with all responsive emails”; and (4) the defendant “did not take
reasonable steps to preserve electronic records.”32
The court rejected each of these arguments.33 First, the court found
that by conducting multiple searches to locate relevant documents, the
defendant made sufficient efforts to produce all reasonably accessible
documents and, as such, there was no factual basis to conclude that the
defendant “signed the discovery responses with knowledge that a
potentially relevant email had been lost” or deleted.34 Next, based on the
number of searches conducted—four—and the documents produced
compared to the purported value of any further production, the court found
that the defendant neither purposely withheld responsive documents nor

27. Id.
28. Tumlin v. Tuggle Duggins P.A., 15 CVS 9887, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 51, at *1 (N.C.
Super. Ct. May 22, 2018).
29. Id. at *1–2.
30. Id. at *7.
31. Id. at *8–11.
32. Id. at *16.
33. Id. at *18–41.
34. Id. at *20–21.
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conducted insufficient searches.35 Lastly, the court concluded that sanctions
were not appropriate, reasoning that the defendant did not intentionally
“deprive [the plaintiff] of potentially relevant information, nor was there a
general abuse of discovery obligations sufficient to support the Court’s
imposing sanctions.”36 Additionally, the court noted that “all parties should
create a detailed [electronically stored information] protocol at the outset of
discovery and should strive to be transparent as to how documents will be
preserved and what searches will be conducted.”37
C. Kixsports, LLC v. Munn
In Kixsports, another North Carolina Business Court action, the court
held that “[t]he deletion of evidence during the pendency of litigation and
the continuing failure to preserve evidence in the face of a court order [were]
sanctionable under Rule 37” of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure.38 The trial court ordered the plaintiffs in Kixsports to produce
its electronic devices for inspection by a forensic expert.39 The expert “was
also authorized to retrieve content associated with various software
applications, such as WhatsApp, Slack, Gmail, and similar applications.”40
Soon thereafter, the defendants moved for sanctions on three grounds.41
First, the defendants contended that the plaintiffs “had repeatedly refused
[the expert’s] requests for the login credentials for some of the software
applications.”42 Second, the plaintiffs’ counsel had received potentially
privileged documents from the forensic expert but failed to provide a
privilege log to the defendants’ counsel.43 Lastly, the defendants
“submitted an affidavit from [the expert] opining that [the plaintiffs] had
deleted relevant evidence.”44 This sanctions motion was eventually
withdrawn, and the defendants reserved their right to refile it later, which
they did.45 When refiling the sanctions motion, the defendants also
requested that the plaintiffs be held in contempt.46
35. Id. at *22–25.
36. Id. at *45.
37. Id. at *44–45.
38. Kixsports, LLC v. Munn, 17 CVS 16373, 2019 NCBC LEXIS 62, at *1, *24–25
(N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2019).
39. Id. at 5–6.
40. Id. at *6.
41. Id.
42. Id. at *6–7.
43. Id. at *7.
44. Id.
45. Id. at *7–9.
46. Id. at *9.
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The court in Kixsports concluded that it was “more likely than not that
[one of the plaintiffs] intentionally deleted backup files for his mobile
device during the pendency of the lawsuit.”47 Given the lack of denial or
explanation of the deletion by the plaintiffs and the absence of a rebuttal,
the court found that the evidence presented by the defendants was consistent
with intentional deletion.48 Additionally, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs “either caused or allowed their smartphones to delete messages
after the complaint was filed . . . , after [the defendants] requested the
communications . . . , [and] after [the defendants] filed their motion to
compel.49 The North Carolina Business Court concluded that it would not
be appropriate to strike the plaintiff’s pleadings, but given the totality of the
circumstances, lesser sanctions were sufficient.50 The lesser sanctions
included: (1) at trial, the court was to “advise the jury regarding [the
plaintiffs’] misconduct and to instruct the jury on spoliation of evidence”;
(2) “additional discovery [was] needed to ameliorate the loss of evidence”;
and (3) the court determined that monetary sanctions were needed “to
compensate the defendants for their costs, including reasonable attorneys’
fees, incurred in connection with filing” the motion to compel.51
D. Out of the Box Developers, LLC v. Logicbit Corp.
This North Carolina Business Court action initially arose when the
plaintiff alleged that the defendants stole customizations from the plaintiff’s
software and incorporated those customizations into a competing case
management software.52 In Out of the Box Developers, the parties entered
into a “Preservation Agreement” to preserve “any documents, files,
program, or other computer-related instrumentalities” that were related to
the business at issue.53 The court ordered that the defendants provide the
plaintiff with access to (1) the customized version of the competing program
as it was used by a law firm in the past, (2) the customized version of the
competing version that the law firm currently used, and (3) the current
off-the-shelf version of the competing program.54

47. Id. at *15.
48. Id. at *15–17.
49. Id. at *18.
50. Id. at *26–27.
51. Id. at *27–29.
52. Out of the Box Devs., LLC v. Logicbit Corp., No. 10 CVS 8327, 2013 NCBC
LEXIS 32, at *6 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 5, 2013).
53. Id.
54. Id. at *21.
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The plaintiff alleged that the defendants failed to comply with the court
order requiring the defendants to provide two of the customized versions
and, in response, the plaintiff filed a motion for discovery sanctions and for
contempt.55 The defendants countered that there was never a request for the
three versions of the software, and therefore, the defendants did “not have
a duty to respond.”56 The court found that there was no justifiable reason
why the defendants did not make an adequate effort to comply with the
discovery requests; thus, in the absence of demonstrating substantial
justifications, the defendants were subject to sanctions under Rule 37 of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.57 The court elected to impose “the
lesser sanction of taxing costs” but indicated that it would be revisiting the
issue should the defendants further fail to comply with the court’s
directives.58
E. OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC v. Oscoda Plastics, Inc.
In Oscoda Plastics, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s imposition of discovery sanctions because the defendant was
not given notice that sanctions might be imposed.59 In discovery, the
plaintiffs requested that the defendant produce all documents that were
related to the defendant’s knowledge of the alleged defects in its flooring.60
“Following [the plaintiffs’] first motion to compel, [the defendant] indicated
that it had certain ‘backup tapes’ that might potentially contain responsive
emails and documents.”61 The trial court subsequently ordered the
defendant “to produce ‘all responsive, non-privileged documents contained
on the backup tapes.’”62 Next, the defendant filed a motion for
reconsideration, in which it contended that recovery of the backup tapes
would be too “expensive and time consuming.”63 Following “two orders
extending [the defendant’s] deadline to produce the backup tapes,” the
defendant represented that “it was unable to access the documents due to
the fact that the backup tapes were encrypted.”64

55. Id. at *24.
56. Id. at *25.
57. Id. at *42–43.
58. Id. at *44–45.
59. OSI Rest. Partners, LLC v. Oscoda Plastics, Inc., 831 S.E.2d 386, 387 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2019).
60. Id. at 388.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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The trial court entered a spoliation order, “concluding that [the
defendant] had ‘intentionally encrypted emails and . . . intentionally failed
to retain the electronic ability to retrieve the subject emails, with knowledge
of their relevance and materiality for this case.’”65 Shortly thereafter, the
defendant produced more than 5,000 pages of documents from its backup
tapes, but the plaintiffs filed a second motion to compel, requesting that the
defendant “further supplement its document production.”66 Eventually, the
defendant produced over 1,000 additional documents, including “highly
relevant emails that . . . were not included within the [initial] 5,000 pages
that [the defendant] produced.”67
“Based upon its findings of
misrepresentations and ‘other acts of misconduct,’ the trial court concluded
that it would ‘impose additional sanctions against [the defendant] pursuant
to North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) and [the court’s]
inherent powers.’”68 The sanctions included striking the defendant’s
answer and entering default against the defendant as to liability on the
plaintiffs’ various claims.69
On appeal, the defendant argued “that the trial court’s order striking its
answer as a discovery sanction violated [the defendant’s] due process
rights.”70 The court of appeals agreed and found that the trial court failed
to allow the defendant appropriate notice of the alleged grounds for the
imposition of sanctions or the fact that sanctions might be imposed.71 The
court held that “the fact that [the defendant] attempted to defend against [the
plaintiff’s] request for additional sanctions at the hearing [was] not evidence
that” the defendant received proper notice.72 Thus, due to the lack of notice,
“the trial court’s order sanctioning [the defendant] by striking its answer”
was reversed.73
F. Stathum-Ward v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
In Stathum-Ward, the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered a
situation in which the plaintiff requested a spoliation instruction at the jury

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 389.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 391.
Id.
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charge conference.74 Ultimately, the trial court struck the spoliation
instruction, but on appeal, the plaintiff asserted “the trial court erred by
refusing to give the spoliation instruction because [the] defendants failed to
preserve video evidence from [the defendant’s] surveillance system.”75 The
plaintiff contended that the instruction was justified “because [the]
defendants had exclusive control over the video evidence and were put on
notice of plaintiff’s injury and the potential for litigation.”76 The court in
Stathum-Ward held that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence “to
determine [that] the trial court abused its discretion in denying [the]
plaintiff’s request for the spoliation jury instruction.”77
Additionally, the court noted that the video evidence at issue was
retained on an in-house server with limited storage capacity.78 The video
stored on this server was “never deleted by anyone, but [was] automatically
overwritten as space [was] needed to store new video.”79 At the time of the
incident in question, video was retained on the server for forty-five to sixty
days. “Thus, video recorded from other parts of the store on the date of the
incident was automatically recorded over by later surveillance video.”80
G. Chesson v. Rives
In this North Carolina Business Court case, the plaintiffs contended
that the defendants should have been sanctioned because: “(1) they altered
certain documents in connection with an audit; (2) they failed to take
appropriate steps to have e-mails that [were] stored on a remote server
preserved; and (3) they destroyed a laptop containing potentially relevant
information.”81
As to the first allegation, the plaintiffs “presented evidence detailing
that documents kept in the course of an audit . . . were altered after . . . [the
defendants] were put on notice of [the] litigation.”82 However, the
documents were not irretrievably lost because the track-changes in the
relevant documents showed the content before they were altered; thus, the

74. Stathum-Ward v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. COA18-738, 2019 N.C. App. LEXIS
416, *7 (N.C. Ct. App. May 7, 2019).
75. Id. at *8.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *9.
78. Id.
79. Id. at *11.
80. Id.
81. Chesson v. Rives, No. 12 CVS 3382, 2017 NCBC LEXIS 218, *1 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Jan. 18, 2017).
82. Id.
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court determined, sanctions based on these alterations were not
appropriate.83
As to the second allegation, the plaintiffs complained that the
defendants “maintain[ed] their electronic business records on a server
maintained by Thomas Reuters but failed to request that Thomas Reuters
preserve relevant e-mails,” and as a result, the e-mails were erased by
Thomas Reuters after one year.84 The parties did not dispute that neither
the defendants nor plaintiffs “contacted Thomas Reuter to request that
documents be preserved”; thus, the court concluded that “neither party
should be sanctioned on that basis.”85
Lastly, as to the third allegation, the plaintiffs claimed that the
defendants “did not maintain the laptop used by [the defendant] in the
course of conducting the audit and failed to acknowledge that they did not
preserve the laptop until four months after the Court ordered its
production.”86 The court concluded that the defendants “were not justified
in failing to maintain [the laptop].”87 The court concluded that, “even if [the
laptop] or the information stored on it was destroyed through no fault of [the
defendants], . . . [the defendants] should have preserved [the laptop] to
allow [the plaintiffs] to conduct a forensic examination.”88 Thus, the failure
to preserve the laptop entitled the plaintiffs “to a jury instruction for a
permissive adverse inference that [the laptop] contained information
unfavorable to [the defendants].”89
H. Primary Takeaways from These Cases
In sum, we may reasonably conclude the following from just this small
survey of North Carolina case law:
1. Forensic examinations of electronically stored information may be
warranted when there exists some factual basis to conclude that the
responding party has not produced discoverable documents, though such

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *3, *6.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *6–7.
Id. at *7.
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communications or privileged information.90

[Vol. 43:477
secrets

or

confidential

2. A litigant’s “diligent” search of its email servers numerous times
and production of responsive, non-privileged emails when appropriate is
sufficient to satisfy a party’s duties of discovery production under Rules
26(g) and 37(b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.91
3. The deletion of discoverable evidence, specifically including
electronic communications that a party allows to be deleted from a
smartphone, during the pendency of litigation and the continuing failure to
preserve evidence in the face of a court order are sanctionable under Rule
37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.92
4. Upon receiving a preservation notice or entering into a preservation
agreement, a party’s failure to preserve all documents, files, or “other
computer-related instrumentalities” may be grounds for sanctions under
Rule 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.93
5. While the striking of a party’s answer without notice may be an
excessive sanction, a litigant can be guilty of spoliation of evidence for
intentionally encrypting electronic emails and intentionally failing to retain
the ability to electronically retrieve the subject communications and
produce them in discovery, particularly when the litigant knows the
documents may be relevant and material to the case at hand.94
6. A party allowing but not intentionally causing evidence to be
automatically deleted from an in-house server with limited storage capacity
after being retained for forty-five to sixty days is not necessarily guilty of
intentional spoliation.95

90. Crosmun v. Trs. of Fayetteville Tech. Cmty. Coll., 832 S.E.2d 223, 234 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2019).
91. Tumlin v. Tuggle Duggins P.A., 15 CVS 9887, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 51, at *21 (N.C.
Super. Ct. May 22, 2018); see also N.C. R. CIV. P. 26(g), 37(b)(2).
92. Kixsports, LLC v. Munn, 17 CVS 16373, 2019 NCBC LEXIS 62, at *1 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Sept. 30, 2019); see also N.C. R. CIV. P. 37.
93. Out of the Box Devs., LLC v. Logicbit Corp., No. 10 CVS 8327, 2013 NCBC
LEXIS 32, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 5, 2013); see also N.C. R. CIV. P. 37.
94. OSI Rest. Partners, LLC v. Oscoda Plastics, Inc., 831 S.E.2d 386, 387 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2019).
95. Stathum-Ward v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. COA18-738, 2019 N.C. App. LEXIS
416, *10–12 (N.C. Ct. App. May 7, 2019).
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7. A litigant who does not take steps to preserve discoverable
evidence, including electronically stored information, when on notice of
pending or current litigation may be penalized by an instruction for a
permissive adverse inference.96
III. BOUNDARIES AND SIGNPOSTS: THE NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND THE NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
The Rules of Professional Conduct govern the standards with which
lawyers must comport themselves. And the Rules of Civil Procedure
provide the standards governing all civil litigation. What—if anything—do
these Rules have to say about ephemeral messaging apps? In truth: not
much, at least specifically. This is not surprising—as mentioned, this
technology is relatively new; the aforementioned Rules are older than those
practicing under them, which, for some senior members of this noble
profession, is very old indeed. But if we take a closer look at the North
Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct and the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure, various points of possible intersection with ephemeral
messaging apps reveal themselves. Let us now examine these possible
points of application and, as above, note the key parameters the Rules might
provide to litigants and attorneys using ephemeral messaging apps in this
state. Our first source of knowledge in this respect rests in the North
Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct and the formal ethics opinions
interpreting the same.
Rule 3.4 of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct indicates
that, out of “fairness to opposing party and counsel,” a “lawyer shall
not . . . unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully
alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential
evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do
any such act.”97 Rule 3.4 goes on to note that a lawyer shall not “knowingly
disobey or advise a client or any other person to disobey an obligation under
the rules of a tribunal, except a lawyer acting in good faith may take
appropriate steps to test the validity of such an obligation.”98 Finally, the
Rule notes that, “in pretrial procedure,” a lawyer is prohibited from
“fail[ing] to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally

96. Chesson v. Rives, No. 12 CVS 3382, 2017 NCBC LEXIS 218, at *7 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Jan. 18, 2017).
97. N.C. R. OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4(a) (2020).
98. N.C. R. OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4(c).
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proper discovery request by an opposing party,” or from “fail[ing] to
disclose evidence or information that the lawyer knew, or reasonably should
have known, was subject to disclosure under applicable law, rules of
procedure or evidence, or court opinions.”99
The second official comment to this Rule of Professional Conduct
elaborates on the discovery implications of this requirement:
Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a
claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing
party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or
subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be
frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed. Applicable
law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for the
purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose
commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a
criminal offense. Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally,
including computerized information. Applicable law may permit a lawyer
to take temporary possession of physical evidence of client crimes for the
purpose of conducting a limited examination that will not alter or destroy
material characteristics of the evidence. In such a case, applicable law may
require the lawyer to turn the evidence over to the police or other
prosecuting authority, depending on the circumstances.100

The fifth comment to the Rule highlights “that a lawyer must be
reasonably diligent in making inquiry of the client, or third party, about
information or documents responsive to discovery requests or disclosure
requirements arising from statutory law, rules of procedure, or caselaw.”101
The comment then goes on to note that “[r]easonably” generally means
acting as “a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer,” and that, “[w]hen
responding to a discovery request or disclosure requirement, a lawyer must
act in good faith.”102 The fifth comment concludes by noting,
[A] lawyer should impress upon the client the importance of making a
thorough search of the client’s records and responding honestly. If the
lawyer has reason to believe that a client has not been forthcoming, the
lawyer may not rely solely upon the client’s assertion that the response is
truthful or complete.103
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

N.C. R. OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4(d)(2)–(3).
N.C. R. OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4 cmt. 2.
N.C. R. OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4 cmt. 5.
Id.
Id.
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Thus, in summation, the following principles drawn from Rule 3.4 of
the Rules of Professional Conduct may implicate the use of ephemeral
messaging apps in litigation in North Carolina:
1. Lawyers cannot obstruct an opposing party’s access to documents
by obfuscating the evidence directly or advising a client to do so.
2. The Rules of Professional Conduct require lawyers to make diligent
efforts to obtain and preserve discoverable information and evidence and to
comply with discovery directives issued by the courts.
3. It is wrongful for a lawyer to destroy evidence or documents for the
purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose
commencement can be foreseen.
4. Lawyers have a duty to impress upon clients the importance of
being honest, thorough, and forthcoming in producing and preserving
records in discovery.
The Ethics Committee of the North Carolina State Bar issued 2014
Formal Ethics Opinion 5 in 2015, and it, too, may provide some possible
points of application to the present analysis.104 The opinion’s second
hypothetical raises a relevant situation: A “client’s legal matter will
probably be litigated, although a lawsuit has not been filed. May the lawyer
instruct the client to remove postings on social media?”105 While ephemeral
messaging apps are not necessarily “social media,” the answer to the inquiry
is nonetheless instructive:
A lawyer may not counsel a client or assist a client to engage in conduct the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. Rule 1.2(d). In addition, a lawyer
may not unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or
unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other material having
potential evidentiary value. Rule 3.4(a). The lawyer, therefore, should
examine the law on preservation of information, spoliation of evidence, and
obstruction of justice to determine whether removing existing postings
would be a violation of the law.106

104. N.C. State Bar, 2014 Formal Ethics Op. 5 (2015) (advising a civil litigation client
about social media).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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The opinion notes that, provided various criteria are satisfied, advising
a client to remove or delete postings is not necessarily a violation of the
North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct: “If removing postings does
not constitute spoliation and is not otherwise illegal, or the removal is done
in compliance with the rules and law on preservation and spoliation of
evidence, the lawyer may instruct the client to remove existing postings on
social media.”107 It is also permissible for the lawyer to “take possession of
printed or digital images of the client’s postings made for purposes of
preservation.”108
The third hypothetical, in its delightful brevity, provides further points
of interest to the present discussion: “May the lawyer instruct the client to
change the security and privacy settings on social media pages to the highest
level of restricted access? . . . Yes, if doing so is not a violation of law or
court order.”109
Thus, we may conclude the following principles from the advice for
2014 Formal Ethics Opinion 5:
1. A lawyer may be guilty of violating Rule 3.4 of the North Carolina
Rules of Professional Conduct if she advises a client to remove or destroy
social media posts or other communications that might have evidentiary
value in pending or expected litigation.
2. A lawyer may not be guilty of violating Rule 3.4 of the North
Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct if she advises a client to restrict
access to or increase security features governing certain posts or other
communications, provided it is not in violation of law or court order.
But the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct do not serve as
our only guiding lights in this analysis; the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure provide us with, if not the most authoritative guidance, at least
the most verbose. Rule 26 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
provides the “[g]eneral provisions governing discovery.”110
First, Rule 26 establishes the scope and limits of discovery; pay
particular attention to the breadth and depth of permissible discovery and
the language regarding electronically stored information:

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
N.C. R. CIV. P. 26.
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Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim
or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, electronically
stored information, or other tangible things and the identity and location of
persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence nor is it grounds for objection that the examining
party has knowledge of the information as to which discovery is sought.
For the purposes of these rules regarding discovery, the phrase
“electronically stored information” includes reasonably accessible metadata
that will enable the discovering party to have the ability to access such
information as the date sent, date received, author, and recipients. The
phrase does not include other metadata unless the parties agree otherwise or
the court orders otherwise upon motion of a party and a showing of good
cause for the production of certain metadata.111

Furthermore, “metadata” is defined as follows:
[E]lectronic information that underlies and describes the e-record with
which it is associated. Stripped of metadata, an e-record loses vital
identifiers and descriptors, resulting in diminished functionality and
searchability. With metadata, “vast storehouses” of otherwise unintelligible
electronic data can be readily searched, organized, and, in many cases,
verified for authenticity and integrity.112

The leading expert on the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, G.
Gray Wilson, notes:
[T]he onset of notice pleading, the discovery rules were designed to enable
a party to find out what his opponent’s case was about. The discovery rules
should be liberally construed to accomplish these purposes, and the
emphasis of the discovery process should not be on gamesmanship but
rather the orderly disclosure of factual information. However valid
complaints about the excessive use of discovery may be, the expansive
treatment afforded the discoverability of information has not suffered. The
spirit of the discovery rules is in harmony with the general philosophy of

111. N.C. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
112. Ben Minegar, Forging a Balanced Presumption in Favor of Metadata Disclosure
Under the Freedom of Information Act, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 23, 24 (2015).
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the civil rules that litigation be addressed expeditiously and on the merits
rather than by a sporting competition of technicalities.113

Moreover, Wilson notes that “Rule 26 [of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure] is essentially the same as its federal counterpart, and
federal decisions interpreting this rule are instructive.”114 Rule 26 of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure also indicates “[s]pecific
limitations” regarding electronically stored information: “discovery of
electronically stored information is subject to the limitations set forth in
Rule 34(b).”115 This limitation thus provides us with a natural segue to the
second of the two Rules of Civil Procedure in North Carolina that likely
impact litigants’ use of ephemeral messaging apps.
Rule 34 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure governs,
among other things, the production of documents and electronically stored
information.116 The statute notes first that
Any party may serve on any other party a request . . . to produce and permit
the party making the request, or someone acting on that party’s behalf, to
inspect and copy, test, or sample any designated documents, electronically
stored information, or tangible things which constitute or contain matters
within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which are in the possession, custody or
control of the party upon whom the request is served[.]117

The Rule goes on to explain the procedures that apply to producing
documents or electronically stored information, noting that parties “must
produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of business” and
that, if “a request does not specify a form for producing the electronically
stored information, a party must produce it in a reasonably usable form or
forms.”118
Once again, for completion, our analysis necessitates consideration of
Wilson’s editorializations:
Rule 34 regulates the procedure for the production and inspection of
documents and tangible things in all civil actions and proceedings, except
where otherwise provided by statute. . . . With one exception, Rule 45 may
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

WILSON, supra note 16, at § 26-1 (citations omitted).
Id.
N.C. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
N.C. R. CIV. P. 34.
N.C. R. CIV. P. 34(a).
N.C. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)–(2).
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also be used to procure the production of documents from nonparty
witnesses or anyone else at a hearing or trial.119

Wilson also notes that the Rules:
[R]equire[] that the documents sought be within the “possession, custody or
control” of the party served with the request. Obviously this requires that
the documents be in existence, and a party may apply to the court for a
document retention order if there is any concern that over the course of the
litigation materials may be destroyed by another party either deliberately or
in the ordinary course of business. A party may not limit production solely
to documents within his physical possession. Any documents to which a
party has access and the right to inspect and copy are covered by this rule.120

Accordingly, we may faithfully adopt the following key principles
from the above North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure that may impact
litigants’ uses of ephemeral messaging apps:
1.
Parties may seek, through discovery, the production of
electronically stored information, including metadata.
2. Parties must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course
of business.
IV. WHEN THE RUBBER MEETS THE ROAD: COURTS THAT HAVE
CONSIDERED EPHEMERAL MESSAGING APPS
As of the date of publication, the undersigned author knows of no
instance wherein a court in North Carolina has considered or ruled on a
party’s use of ephemeral messaging apps. In fact, it appears very few courts
anywhere have dealt with the subject. Thus, the three cases below, taken
from various jurisdictions, showcase what may be the only—or at least a
large portion—of the instances wherein courts have considered and ruled
upon litigants’ use of this new technology.
A. Columbia Pictures Industries v. Bunnell
In Columbia Pictures Industries v. Bunnell, a case out of the Central
District of California, plaintiffs filed a copyright infringement claim against
119. WILSON, supra note 16, at § 34-1.
120. Id. at § 34-2.
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the defendants on February 23, 2006, alleging that the “defendants
knowingly enable[d], encourage[d], induce[d], and profit[ed] from massive
online piracy of plaintiffs’ copyrighted works through the operation of their
internet website.”121 The defendants “operate[d] a website known as
‘TorrentSpy,’ which offer[ed] dot-torrent files for download by users.”122
The defendants’ webserver was located in the Netherlands in an attempt to
attract users who did not want their identities known.123
When a user clicked on a webpage, “the website’s web server program
receive[d] from the user a request for the page or the file.”124 This “request
include[d] the IP address of the user’s computer, and the name of the
requested page or file, among other things”; that information was copied
and stored in RAM, “a form of temporary computer storage.”125 “If the
website’s logging function [was] enabled, the web server copie[d] the
request into a log file, as well as the fact that the requested file was
delivered.”126 On the other hand, “[i]f the logging function [was] not
enabled, the request [was] not retained.”127 The defendants’ web server,
Microsoft Internet Information Services, possessed logging functionality,
but the defendants’ “website’s logging function ha[d] not been enabled to
retain the Server Log Data.”128 “Although defendants did not affirmatively
retain the Server Log Data through logging or other means, the data went
through and was temporarily stored in the RAM of defendants’ website
server for approximately six hours.”129 On May 15, 2006, the plaintiffs sent
their one and only preservation request to the defendants that specifically
addressed data temporarily stored in RAM.130 This notice reminded the
defendants “of their obligation to preserve all potentially discoverable
evidence in their possession, custody or control related to the litigation,
including all logs for the TorrentSpy website, and records of all
communications between the defendants and users of the website, including
instant-messaging and other chat logs,” but “[t]his notice did not

121. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093FMC(JCx), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 46364, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
122. Id. at *9.
123. Id. at *11–13.
124. Id. at *10.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *11–12.
129. Id. at *13.
130. Id. at *16–18.
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specifically request that defendants preserve Server Log Data temporarily
stored only in RAM.”131
On March 12, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a motion requesting “that the
court issue an order requiring defendants to preserve and produce certain
data responsive to plaintiffs’ First Request for Production of Documents.”132
The plaintiffs sought production and preservation of “(a) the IP addresses
of users of defendants’ website who request ‘dot-torrent’ files; (b) the
requests for ‘dot-torrent files’; and (c) the dates and times of such requests
(collectively ‘Server Log Data’)” and “evidentiary sanctions against
defendants for their alleged spoliation of the Server Log Data.”133 The
defendants requested “that the court require plaintiffs to pay reasonable
expenses incurred in opposing Plaintiffs’ Motion, including attorneys’ fees,
pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 37(a)(4)(B).”134
Subsequent to the filing of the plaintiffs’ motion, the defendants
entered into a contract with a third-party entity, Panther.135 According to
the court, after the defendants entered into this contract with Panther,
“[r]equests from users who visit[ed] defendants’ website for a dot-torrent
file on defendants’ server [were then] routed from a location not hosted on
defendants’ server to a Panther server geographically proximate to the users
making the requests.”136 As a result, “Panther [then] receive[d] the Server
Log Data in issue in its RAM.”137 The defendants argued
that the Server Log Data [did not] constitute electronically stored
information under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 34(a) because the data
[had] never been electronically stored on their website or in any medium
from which the data [could] be retrieved or examined, or fixed in any
tangible form, such as a hard drive.138

Importantly, the court held that because the Server Log Data, in this
case, was transmitted through and temporarily stored in RAM while the
requests of users for dot-torrent files were processed, data in RAM did
constitute electronically stored information under Rule 34.139

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *14–15.
Id. at *15.
Id. at *21–22.
Id. at *23.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2021

25

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 7

502

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:477

The court noted that, as “Rule 34(a) is limited in its scope to documents
and electronically stored information which are in the possession, custody
or control of the party upon whom the request is served,” the court had to
consider whether the Server Log Data was within the scope of Rule 34(a)
because the Server Log Data was directed to Panther’s RAM, as opposed to
the RAM on the defendants’ website.140 The court held that because the
defendants had “the ability to manipulate at will how the Server Log Data
[was] routed,” the data was in defendants’ possession, custody, or control. 141
As Rule 34 requires a party to produce only documents that are already in
existence, the defendants argued that “because their website ha[d] never
recorded or stored Server Log Data since the commencement of the
website’s operations, requiring defendants to retain such data would be
tantamount to requiring them to create a record of the Server Log Data for
its production.”142 However, the court held that “because the Server Log
Data already exist[ed], [was] temporarily stored in RAM, and [was]
controlled by defendants, an order requiring defendants to preserve and
produce such data [was] not tantamount to ordering the creation of new
data.”143
In the plaintiffs’ motion, the plaintiffs requested that the court issue an
order that required the “defendants to preserve the Server Log Data.”144 The
defendants objected “on the grounds that the Server Log Data is not subject
to any preservation obligation and that requiring such preservation would
be unduly burdensome.”145 The court noted:
In determining whether to issue a preservation order, courts undertake to
balance at least three factors: (1) the level of concern the court has for the
continuing existence and maintenance of the integrity of the evidence in the
absence of an order directing preservation; (2) any irreparable harm likely
to result to the party seeking the preservation of the evidence absent an order
directing preservation; and (3) the capability of the party to maintain the
evidence sought to be preserved, not only as to the evidence’s original form,
condition or contents, but also the physical, spatial and financial burdens
created by ordering evidence preservation.146

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at *23–25.
Id. at *25–26.
Id. at *26.
Id. at *27.
Id. at *28.
Id.
Id. at *28–29 (citation omitted).
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The court held that because the defendants did not “retain and
affirmatively object to retention of the Server Log Data, and in light of the
key relevance of such data in this action, the first two factors clearly weigh
in favor of requiring preservation of the Server Log Data.”147
The court first considered the potential burden of employing a
“technical mechanism through which retention of the Server Log Data in
RAM [could] be enabled” and found that employing such a mechanism
“would not be an undue burden on defendants.”148
The court then considered the potential burden of actually retaining
and producing the Server Log Data.149 Addressing the defendants’
argument that their server could not handle the volume of data that the
Server Log Data would accumulate, the court found that requiring the
defendants to preserve and produce solely the Server Log Data at issue
would not be an undue burden.150 The defendants also raised “issues
concerning the privacy of their website users based upon defendants’
privacy policy, the First Amendment and multiple federal statutes.”151 The
court did not find the defendants’ arguments persuasive due to the order that
directed the defendants to mask users’ IP addresses before producing the
Server Log Data.152 Ultimately, the court found that the factors weighed “in
favor of requiring defendants to preserve and produce the Server Log
Data.”153 The court relied upon
the key relevance of the Server Log Data to th[e] action, the specificity of
the data sought, the lack of alternative means to acquire such information,
and the fact that defendants [were] United States individuals and entities
who affirmatively chose to locate their server in the Netherlands at least in
part to take advantage of the perceived protections afforded by that
country’s information security law.154

The defendants also argued that they should not be required to produce
the Server Log Data for the same reasons they believed a preservation order
should not be issued.155 “On a motion to compel discovery, the party from

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at *29.
Id.
Id. at *30.
Id. at *31–32.
Id. at *32.
Id. at *36.
Id. at *50–51.
Id. at *51.
Id.
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whom electronically stored information is sought must show that the
information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or
cost.”156 The court found:
(1) [The] defendants . . . failed to demonstrate that the Server Log Data
[was] not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost; (2) [the]
plaintiffs . . . show[ed] good cause to order discovery of such data; (3) the
discovery sought [was] not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative or
obtainable from some other source that [was] more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive; (4) [the] plaintiffs ha[d] not otherwise had
the opportunity to obtain the data sought; and (5) the burden and expense of
the proposed discovery [did] not outweigh its likely benefit, taking into
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the
importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.157

The plaintiffs also requested evidentiary sanctions against the
defendants for spoliation of the Server Log Data.158 However, the court
found such sanctions were unnecessary and inappropriate, as the
“defendants’ failure to retain the Server Log Data in RAM was based on a
good faith belief that preservation of data temporarily stored only in RAM
was not legally required.”159
In conclusion, the defendants were ordered to (1) “commence
preservation of the Server Log Data” within seven days of the court order
and “preserve the Server Log Data for the duration of [the] litigation,” (2)
produce the Server Log Data no more than two weeks from the court order
date and update such production no less frequently than every two weeks,
and (3) “preserve the IP addresses of the computers used to request
dot-torrent files,” but may mask, encrypt, or redact IP addresses.160
B. Waymo LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc.
In this case from the Northern District of California, Waymo LLC
commenced a lawsuit on February 23, 2017, against, among other
defendants, “Uber Technologies, Inc., and Ottomotto LLC (collectively,
“Uber”) for misappropriation of eight alleged trade secrets” concerning

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at *51–52 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B)).
Id. at *52–53.
Id. at *53.
Id. at *55.
Id. at *56–57.
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self-driving technology.161 Among several other issues, the court
considered Uber’s use of ephemeral messaging and Waymo’s motion for
relief due to Uber’s alleged spoliation.162 “Waymo [moved] under both
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) and the Court’s inherent authority for
an adverse-inference instruction against Uber on the basis that Uber
spoliated evidence.”163 However, because the relevant evidence consisted
of electronically stored information, the court ruled that Rule 37(e) was the
correct legal standard, not inherent authority, and that potential litigants
have a duty to preserve evidence and relevant information when “a
reasonable party in the same factual circumstances would have reasonably
foreseen litigation.”164 The court noted that “[s]poliation is the destruction
or material alteration of evidence or the failure to preserve property for
another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable
litigation.”165
The court found “the record clearly [showed] . . . not only that a
reasonable party in Uber’s circumstances would have reasonably foreseen
this litigation in January 2016, but also that Uber actually foresaw this
litigation in January 2016 when it commenced the process of acquiring
Otto.”166 However, Uber claimed that it did not reasonably foresee the
litigation in 2016 and therefore did not have a duty to preserve evidence.167
As proof that Uber reasonably foresaw the litigation beginning in January
2016, the court found: (1) in January 2016, Uber retained litigation counsel
for legal advice concerning “potential liability exposure arising out of its
planned acquisition of Ottomoto . . . , including for potential claims that
could be brought by Waymo specifically”;168 (2) in March 2016, Uber
retained Stroz “to perform a due diligence investigation” to aid Uber’s
litigation counsel;169 and (3) “the purported joint-defense and
common-interest privileges among the parties to the Otto acquisition were
an elaborate artifice carefully and meticulously constructed for the purpose

161. Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 17-00939 WHA, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16020, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2018).
162. Id. at *49, 69.
163. Id. at *49.
164. Id. at *49–51 (quoting Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed.
Cir. 2011)).
165. Id. at *50 (citing Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 976, 989 (N.D.
Cal. 2012)).
166. Id. at *51 (emphasis removed).
167. Id. at *52.
168. Id.
169. Id. at *53.
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of shrouding the acquisition and ‘due diligence’ process in secrecy.” 170
Although Uber argued that these pieces of evidence showed only that “Uber
anticipated ‘potential litigation,’”171 the court held that “any reasonable
party in Uber’s position would have reasonably foreseen litigation from
Waymo for trade secret misappropriation related to the defections of
Levandowski and other Otto employees.”172 Therefore, Uber’s duty to
preserve evidence began, at least, in January 2016.173
Waymo argued that Uber failed to take reasonable steps to preserve
five categories of evidence: (1) “hundreds of text messages among
Levandowski, Ron, Kalanick, and Qi [were] deleted”; (2) “Levandowski
and Ron also deleted their electronic communications, files, and Slack
records”; (3) “Levandowski supposedly destroyed five discs”; (4) “emails
and email archives from Tyto LIDAR, LLC, were apparently deleted after
its acquisition by Ottomotto”; and (5) “Waymo . . . was denied access to
Levandowski’s personal laptops.”174
The court rejected Waymo’s
spoliation argument regarding Levandowski’s laptops because
Levandowski asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege.175 With respect to
the other four categories of evidence, Uber argued that it should not be
sanctioned for spoliation of evidence because “(1) Waymo’s motion came
too late . . . , (2) the spoliated evidence was irrelevant . . . , and (3) Uber
acted in good faith.”176
First, the court found that “the spoliation issue continued to evolve
even after Waymo filed its motion with the eleventh-hour discovery of”
additional materials and evidence.177 Second, the court stated that “Uber
cannot now evade spoliation by speculating that all of the lost information
was benign,” and “Uber’s unfounded insistence that the evidence it failed
to preserve would have been irrelevant does not bar Waymo’s request for
relief.”178 Regarding spoliation, the court found that Waymo seemed
“unwilling or unable to prove its case at trial with qualified witnesses and
evidence and [sought] to have the Court fill in the gaps with adverse
inferences instead.”179 Because of this, the court reserved the “decision on
the question of whether or not Uber spoliated evidence with the intent to
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at *53–54.
Id. at *54.
Id. at *55.
Id.
Id. at *55–56.
Id. at *56.
Id. at *57.
Id. at *58.
Id. at *58–60.
Id. at *61.
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deprive another party of its use in litigation, and further [reserved] decision
as to whether or not the jury [would] be instructed that it may or must
presume the lost information was unfavorable to Uber.”180
Uber’s use of ephemeral messaging apps requires some additional
context. The court noted that “Richard Jacobs was a former Uber employee
turned ‘whistleblower’ whose attorney sent Uber a 37-page demand letter
dated May 5, 2017, filled with scandalous accusations that led to a jackpot
settlement.”181 An “evidentiary hearing unearthed the existence of a
resignation email that Jacobs had sent to Uber’s leadership on April 14,
2017, further detailing his allegations against Uber, and a subsequent
confidential settlement agreement between Jacobs and Uber.”182 “The
demand letter, resignation email, and settlement agreement (collectively,
‘the Jacobs materials’) contained a barrage of scandalous allegations against
Uber ranging from deliberate spoliation and systemic abuse of
attorney-client privilege to hacking and corporate espionage.”183 The court
made three primary conclusions regarding the Jacobs materials and Uber’s
response thereto.184
First, the court agreed that Uber should have produced the Jacobs letter
in discovery and that Uber’s failure to do so constituted “discovery
misconduct.”185 The court ruled that Waymo could present certain instances
of Uber’s purported “discovery misconduct” to the jury; specifically,
Waymo was permitted to inform the jury that Uber withheld the Jacobs
letter and explain that the jury may, but need not, draw some adverse
inference against Uber based on that withholding.186 Second, the court ruled
that Waymo could adduce certain facts before the jury to show that Uber
sought information about the technical details of Waymo’s self-driving
technology, and, of particular note for our purposes, that “Uber sought to
minimize its ‘paper trail’ by using ephemeral communications.”187 In
relevant part, the court held that “Uber’s use of ephemeral communications
is also relevant as a possible explanation for why Waymo has failed to turn
up more evidence of misappropriation in this case.”188 Further, the court
held that Waymo would be allowed to “present evidence and argument on
this subject at trial, provided that it [could] do so through qualified witnesses
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id. at *62.
Id. at *12.
Id.
Id. at *63.
Id.
Id. at *62–63.
Id. at *63.
Id. at *69.
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and evidence.”189 The court also held that in response, Uber would be
allowed to “present its own evidence and argument that its use of ephemeral
communications shows no wrongdoing, including by pointing out Waymo’s
own use of ephemeral communications.”190 Third, the court ruled that the
Jacobs materials themselves would be excluded at trial as hearsay unless
used to impeach Jacobs.191
C. Herzig v. Arkansas Foundation for Medical Care, Inc.
In Herzig v. Arkansas Foundation for Medical Care, Inc., a case out
of the Western District of Arkansas, the plaintiffs Brian Herzig and Neal
Martin filed age discrimination claims against their previous employer,
Arkansas Foundation for Medical Care, Inc. (AFMC), after they were
terminated “for repeated misrepresentations to AFMC that the Laserfiche
Integration Program was secure and HIPAA-compliant.”192 Herzig was the
Director of Information Technology and “was responsible for development,
production, and maintenance of AFMC’s IT systems and for ensuring
compliance with data confidentiality and security policies.”193 Martin was
the Assistant Director of Information Technology and “was responsible for
application development projects and implementation of programs and
applications.”194 In his position, “Martin reported directly to Herzig.”195
In 2016, AFMC developed an in-house medical necessity review
software, ReviewPoint.196 “ReviewPoint was intended to integrate servers
hosting protected health information through a software platform called
‘Laserfiche’ with customized and default features of a software program
called ‘Salesforce.’”197 Herzig, Martin, and other employees of the IT
Department were “responsible for the Laserfiche Integration Program,
which would allow Salesforce to access the Laserfiche-based protected
health information in a way that complied with AFMC’s HIPAA obligations
to limit and log personnel access to that information.”198 However, in
March 2017, employees of AFMC’s Business Intelligence Department

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at *63.
192. Herzig v. Ark. Found. for Med. Care, Inc., No. 2:18-CV-02101, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 111296, at *10–11 (W.D. Ark. July 3, 2019).
193. Id. at *4.
194. Id. at *5.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at *5–6.
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learned of an exploit that could allow “a ReviewPoint user to
bypass . . . security and gain unauthorized access to protected health
information.”199 During a subsequent review to determine whether any
users had used the exploit, another security problem was identified:
“Laserfiche was not logging access by users who actually accessed
protected health information.”200 After an investigation, Herzig, Martin,
and two other employees were terminated “for their contributions to the
Laserfiche Integration Program’s vulnerabilities and, in Herzig and
Martin’s case, for repeated misrepresentations to AFMC that the Laserfiche
Integration Program was secure and HIPAA-compliant.”201 Herzig and
Martin subsequently filed age discrimination claims with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission against AFMC. 202
“When the parties conferred pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(f), they agreed that AFMC might request data from Herzig
and Martin’s mobile phones and that the parties had taken reasonable
measures to preserve potentially discoverable data from alteration or
destruction.”203 Herzig and Martin produced screenshots of messages
between the two of them dated up to August 20, 2018; however, after
litigation began, the two downloaded and communicated on an ephemeral
messaging application called Signal.204 “Signal allows users to send and
receive encrypted text messages accessible only to sender and recipient, and
to change settings to automatically delete these messages after a short period
of time.”205 Herzig and Martin did not disclose these communications until
near the end of the discovery period in Herzig’s deposition.206 AFMC filed
a motion for dismissal or adverse inference on the basis of spoliation and a
motion for summary judgment.207
In its motion for dismissal or adverse inference on the basis of spoliation,
AFMC argue[d] that despite Herzig and Martin’s duty to impose litigation
holds and to update responses to requests for production following their
initial and reluctant production of text messages, Herzig and Martin instead

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *11.
Id.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *12–13.
Id. at *13.
Id. at *1.
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intentionally acted to withhold and destroy discoverable evidence by
installing and using the Signal application on their mobile devices.208

Based on the content of Herzig and Martin’s previous
communications, reluctance to produce responsive communications,
familiarity with information technology, and initial misleading responses,
the court agreed that, by downloading and using an ephemeral messaging
app, Herzig and Martin withheld and destroyed their communications
intentionally and in bad faith.209 The court stated that this intentional,
bad-faith spoliation of evidence warranted a sanction; however, because
Herzig and Martin’s case was dismissed on the merits, the court did not
have to determine what sanction was appropriate.210
D. Primary Takeaways from These Cases
In sum, we may reasonably conclude the following from this limited
number of cases addressing ephemeral messaging applications:
1. Data stored in RAM constitutes electronically stored information
under Rule 34. If a party has the ability to manipulate at will how data is
routed, then the court can find that the data is in that party’s possession,
custody, or control for purposes of Rule 34. If data already exists, is
temporarily stored in RAM, and is controlled by a defendant, then an order
requiring a defendant to preserve and produce such data is not tantamount
to ordering the creation of new data.211
2. Courts may find a party’s use of ephemeral communications as a
possible explanation for why an opposing party lacks evidence. Courts or
juries may also conclude that a party engaged in spoliation or made efforts
to eliminate a “paper trail” if that party used ephemeral communications
after learning about the possibility of litigation.212
3. Courts can conclude that, by downloading and using an ephemeral
messaging app once litigation has begun, a party may be guilty of

208. Id. at *13.
209. Id. at *14–15.
210. Id. at *15.
211. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093FMC(JCx), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 46364, at *52–53 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
212. Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 17-00939 WHA, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16020, at *63, 69 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2018).
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withholding and destroying discoverable communications intentionally and
in bad faith.213
V. SO, WHAT DO WE DO NOW? PRACTICAL APPLICATION AND
SUGGESTIONS
For purposes of symmetry, familiarity, and ease of reading, I had
hoped to have only ten guiding principles at this point, but obviously that
plan failed. From recent discovery litigation in North Carolina, the North
Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the rulings and decisions of other courts regarding
ephemeral messaging apps, we may conclude that the following boundaries
or signposts may govern the use of ephemeral messaging apps in North
Carolina by litigants and attorneys:
1. Forensic examinations of electronically stored information may be
warranted when there exists some factual basis to conclude that the
responding party has not produced discoverable documents, though such
examinations must not disclose trade secrets or confidential
communications or privileged information.214
2. A litigant’s “diligent” search of its email servers numerous times
and production of responsive, non-privileged emails when appropriate is
sufficient to satisfy a party’s duties of discovery production under Rules
26(g) and 37(b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.215
3. The deletion of discoverable evidence, specifically including
electronic communications that a party allows to be deleted from a
smartphone, during the pendency of litigation and the continuing failure to
preserve evidence in the face of a court order are sanctionable under Rule
37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.216
4. Upon receiving a preservation notice or entering into a preservation
agreement, a party’s failure to preserve all documents, files, or “other

213. Herzig, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111296, at *14–15.
214. Crosmun v. Trs. of Fayetteville Tech. Cmty. Coll., 832 S.E.2d 223, 234 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2019).
215. Tumlin v. Tuggle Duggins P.A., 15 CVS 9887, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 51, at *1, *18–
20 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 22 2018); see also N.C. R. CIV. P. 26(g), 37(b)(2).
216. Kixsports, LLC v. Munn, 17 CVS 16373, 2019 NCBC LEXIS 62, at *1, *39 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2019); see also N.C. R. CIV. P. 37.
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computer-related instrumentalities” may be grounds for sanctions under
Rule 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.217
5. While the striking of a party’s answer without notice may be an
excessive sanction, a litigant can be guilty of spoliation of evidence for
intentionally encrypting electronic emails and intentionally failing to retain
the ability to electronically retrieve the subject communications and
produce them in discovery, particularly when the litigant knows the
documents may be relevant and material to the case at hand.218
6. A party allowing but not intentionally causing evidence to be
automatically deleted from an in-house server with limited storage capacity
after being retained for forty-five to sixty days is not necessarily guilty of
intentional spoliation.219
7. A litigant who does not take steps to preserve discoverable
evidence, including electronically stored information, when on notice of
pending or current litigation may be penalized by an instruction for a
permissive adverse inference.220
8. Lawyers cannot obstruct an opposing party’s access to documents
by obfuscating the evidence directly or advising a client to do so.221
9. The Rules of Professional Conduct require lawyers to make diligent
efforts to obtain and preserve discoverable information and evidence and to
comply with discovery directives issued by the courts.222
10. It is wrongful for a lawyer to destroy evidence or documents for
the purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one
whose commencement can be foreseen.223

217. Out of the Box Devs., LLC v. Logicbit Corp., No. 10 CVS 8327, 2013 NCBC
LEXIS 32, at *6 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 5, 2013); see also N.C. R. CIV. P. 37.
218. OSI Rest. Partners, LLC v. Oscoda Plastics, Inc., 831 S.E.2d 386, 388 (N.C. App.
2019).
219. Stathum-Ward v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. COA18-738, 2019 N.C. App. LEXIS
416, *10–12 (N.C. Ct. App. May 7, 2019).
220. Chesson v. Rives, No. 12 CVS 3382, 2017 NCBC LEXIS 218, at *1, *5 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Jan. 18, 2017).
221. N.C. R. OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4 (2020).
222. Id.
223. Id.
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11. Lawyers have a duty to impress upon clients the importance of
being honest, thorough, and forthcoming in producing and preserving
records in discovery.224
12. A lawyer may be guilty of violating Rule 3.4 of the North Carolina
Rules of Professional Conduct if she advises a client to remove or destroy
social media posts or other communications that might have evidentiary
value in pending or expected litigation.225
13. A lawyer may not be guilty of violating Rule 3.4 of the North
Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct if she advises a client to restrict
access to or increase security features governing certain posts or other
communications, provided it is not in violation of law or court order.226
14. Parties may seek, through discovery, the production of
electronically stored information, including metadata.227
15. Parties must produce documents as they are kept in the usual
course of business.228
16. Data stored in RAM constitutes electronically stored information
under Rule 34. If a party has the ability to manipulate at will how data is
routed, then the court can find that the data is in that party’s possession,
custody, or control for purposes of Rule 34. If data already exists, is
temporarily stored in RAM, and is controlled by a defendant, then an order
requiring a defendant to preserve and produce such data is not tantamount
to ordering the creation of new data.229
17. Courts may find a party’s use of ephemeral communications as a
possible explanation for why an opposing party lacks evidence. Courts or
juries may also conclude that a party engaged in spoliation or made efforts

224. Id.
225. N.C. State Bar, 2014 Formal Ethics Op. 5 (2015) (advising a civil litigation client
about social media); N.C. R. OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4.
226. N.C. State Bar, 2014 Formal Ethics Op. 5 (2015); N.C. R. OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4.
227. N.C. R. CIV. P. 26, 34.
228. Id.
229. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093FMC(JCx), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 46364, at *52–53 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
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to eliminate a “paper trail” if that party used ephemeral communications
after learning about the possibility of litigation.230
18. Courts can conclude that, by downloading and using an ephemeral
messaging app once litigation has begun, a party may be guilty of
withholding and destroying discoverable communications intentionally and
in bad faith.231
In light of this, what may we conclude regarding a party’s use of
ephemeral messaging apps in North Carolina? As with most legal inquiries,
it likely depends on the situation, the litigants, the attorneys, the courts, or
the facts of the individual case, including, particularly, how and when the
apps are used and by whom. But as that answer makes for a poor
conclusion—and even worse legal analysis—the more helpful method is
likely to consider various hypotheticals and apply what we have learned to
the individual situations, hopefully not only to predict how North Carolina
courts might treat ephemeral messaging apps, but also to examine how
North Carolina courts should treat them.
A. Hypothetical One
Mr. Johnson and his neighbor, Jake, often argue over Jake’s
interactions with Mr. Johnson’s wife, Ellie. Mr. Johnson’s jealousies are
well-founded: Jake and Ellie regularly send each other private text messages
regarding their ongoing romantic relationship. Upon discovering only a
select few of the amorous text messages between his spouse and his
neighbor, Mr. Johnson made plain to all his determination to hire an
attorney and file suit against Jake for alienation of affection. Ellie, smarter
than the lot of them, suggested to Jake that they download and begin using
an ephemeral messaging app to discuss, among other things, their continued
romantic feelings for each other and their determined efforts to defeat Mr.
Johnson in court. Once litigation based on Mr. Johnson’s alienation of
affection claim began, Mr. Johnson’s attorney sent Jake and Ellie a
preservation notice. During their respective depositions, Jake and Ellie
unsuccessfully hid the fact that they used an ephemeral messaging app to
communicate with each other. Jake and Ellie claim, through counsel,
however, that they started using the app well before suit was actually filed
and thus cannot be guilty of spoliation and that it would be wrongful of the
230. Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 17-00939 WHA, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16020, at *63, 69 (N.C. Cal. Jan. 29, 2018).
231. Herzig v. Ark. Found. for Med. Care, Inc., No. 2:18-CV-02101, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 111296, at *10 (W.D. Ark. July 3, 2019).
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court to instruct the jury to draw any negative inferences from their use of
the app. Mr. Johnson’s attorney claims that there are two sets of
communications that Jake and Ellie have spoliated: (1) those exchanged
after Mr. Johnson declared his intent to file suit but before Mr. Johnson had
actually filed his suit and (2) those exchanged after suit was filed and a
preservation notice was sent.
How should a North Carolina court rule? Based on what we know
from recent discovery litigation in North Carolina, the North Carolina Rules
of Professional Conduct, the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, and
the rulings and decisions of other courts regarding ephemeral messaging
apps, a North Carolina court should rule that (a) a forensic examination of
Jake and Ellie’s phones would be appropriate to determine if, when, and to
what extent they used an ephemeral messaging app; (b) Jake and Ellie
spoliated both sets of communications and thus are subject to sanctions; and
(c) an instruction to the jury that it be permitted to draw any negative
inferences from Jake and Ellie’s use of the app would be appropriate.
First, there is no doubt that the communications are discoverable:
parties may seek, through discovery, the production of electronically stored
information, including metadata.232 Second, we know from the holding in
Crosmun v. Treasurers of Fayetteville Technical Community College, that
forensic examinations of electronically stored information, like the
communications between Jake and Ellie—or the lack thereof—may be
warranted when there exists some factual basis to conclude that the
responding party has not produced or has destroyed discoverable
documents.233 Moreover, the deletion of evidence, specifically including
electronic communications like the text exchanges between Jake and Ellie
on the ephemeral messaging app, during the pendency of litigation is
sanctionable under Rule 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure.234
Furthermore, since Jake and Ellie deleted communications by using
the ephemeral messaging app both after they were aware of the likelihood
of litigation and after receiving the preservation notice from Mr. Johnson,
they are guilty of spoliation as it concerns both sets of communications.
The holding in Chesson v. Rives makes it clear that a litigant who does not
take steps to preserve discoverable evidence when on notice of pending
litigation may be penalized by an instruction for a permissive adverse

232. N.C. R. CIV. P. 26, 34.
233. Crosmun v. Trs. of Fayetteville Tech. Cmty. Coll., 832 S.E.2d 223, 239 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2019).
234. Kixsports, LLC v. Munn, 17 CVS 16373, 2019 NCBC LEXIS 62, at *23 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2019).
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inference.235 Additionally, pursuant to the court’s analysis in Out of the Box
Developers, LLC v. Logicbit Corp., upon receiving the preservation notice
from Mr. Johnson, Jake and Ellie had a duty to preserve all documents, files,
or “other computer-related instrumentalities”; their failure to do so is
grounds for sanctions under Rule 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure. Moreover, if the court analyzes the facts of Jake and Ellie’s
situation like the court did in Herzig v. Arkansas Foundation for Medical
Care, Inc., the court could conclude that, by downloading and using an
ephemeral messaging app once litigation had begun, Jake and Ellie were
guilty of withholding and destroying discoverable communications
intentionally and in bad faith.236
When considering what sanction might be appropriate, the court
should find the holding in OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC v. Oscoda
Plastics, Inc. instructive. While the striking of Jake or Ellie’s answer
without notice may be an excessive sanction, the court would have grounds
to find that Jake and Ellie spoliated evidence by intentionally encrypting
electronic communications between them, thereby intentionally failing to
retain the ability to electronically retrieve the subject communications,
particularly since Jake and Ellie knew the documents may be relevant and
material to the case at hand and nonetheless chose to use an ephemeral
messaging app anyway.237 The court would also be justified in finding that
Jake and Ellie’s use of the ephemeral messaging app explains why Mr.
Johnson lacks more evidence to support his alienation of affection claim
and instruct the jury accordingly.238
B. Hypothetical Two
Janey, a college student, entered into a contract to purchase a horse
from Clara, in exchange for Janey completing work on Clara’s ranch. Janey
completed the work as contracted, but Clara refused to provide her the
horse. Janey sued Clara for breach of contract. Janey then began
exchanging text messages and emails with Lorie, a disgruntled former
employee of Clara’s, in an effort to obtain inside information to use against
Clara in the litigation. The text messages were exchanged first via normal

235. Chesson v. Rives, No. 12 CVS 3382, 2017 NCBC LEXIS 218, at *1 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Jan. 18, 2017).
236. Herzig v. Ark. Found. for Med. Care, Inc., No. 2:18-CV-02101, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 111296, at *10 (W.D. Ark. July 3, 2019).
237. OSI Rest. Partners, LLC v. Oscoda Plastics, Inc., 831 S.E.2d 386, 387 (N.C. App.
2019).
238. Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 17-00939 WHA, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16020, at *8 (N.C. Cal. Jan. 29, 2018).
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text messaging on Janey’s and Lorie’s phones, but then later via an
ephemeral messaging app; the emails were exchanged via a student email
service from Janey’s college. Text messages sent through the normal
channels on Janey’s and Lorie’s phones were originally saved on the
phones’ RAM, but once they downloaded and began using the ephemeral
messaging app, the messages never made it to the phones’ RAM storage
and were, instead, immediately deleted after being read by the recipient.
The emails, even deleted ones, were saved in the usual course of business
on an in-house server at the college but were, unbeknownst to Janey and
Lorie, only kept for sixty days before being automatically deleted by school
administrators to save storage capacity.
In discovery, Janey admitted to communicating with Lorie via her
student email and via an ephemeral messaging app. Upon Clara’s request,
Janey had the servers holding her student emails searched three times;
several emails between Janey and Lorie were found, but none older than
sixty days, as the emails older than sixty days had been deleted from the
servers. Janey refused to produce any text messages, claiming that requiring
her to produce those prior to her using the ephemeral messaging app would
be a requirement that she create new data and that those exchanged via the
ephemeral messaging app no longer existed. Janey produced the emails she
found, but Clara claims, through counsel, that Janey is guilty of spoliation
as it concerned the emails older than sixty days and the text messages
exchanged via the ephemeral messaging app. Clara also claims that Janey’s
refusal to produce the text messages exchanged prior to her using the
ephemeral messaging app is wrongful.
How should a North Carolina court rule? Once again, based on what
we know from the rules and relevant case law, a North Carolina court should
rule that (a) Janey is not guilty of spoliation as it concerns the emails
automatically deleted after sixty days from the student-email server; (b)
Janey was right to produce the emails kept on the email server that were still
there, and her searches of the server for them were adequate; (c) Janey is
guilty of spoliation as it concerns the text messages she exchanged with
Lorie via the ephemeral messaging app once litigation began; and (d) Janey
must produce the text messages exchanged prior to her using the ephemeral
messaging app.
First, there is no doubt that the communications are discoverable:
parties may seek, through discovery, the production of electronically stored
information, including metadata.239 Moreover, Janey’s diligent searches of
her student-email servers numerous times and production of the responsive,
non-privileged emails are sufficient to satisfy Janey’s duties of discovery
239. N.C. R. CIV. P. 26, 34.
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production under Rules 26(g) and 37(b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure.240 She had a duty to produce the emails, as they were kept
in the usual course of business.241 Janey is not guilty of intentional
spoliation by passively and unknowingly allowing the emails older than
sixty days to be automatically deleted from her college’s in-house server
due to limited storage capacity.242
However, by allowing her text messages with Lorie to be immediately
deleted by using an ephemeral messaging app rather than stored on RAM
on the phone, Janey is guilty of intentional spoliation; moreover, since the
data stored in RAM constitutes electronically stored information under Rule
34, the court would be justified in finding that the data is in Janey’s
possession, custody, or control for purposes of Rule 34 and thus must be
produced.243 If data already exists, is temporarily stored in RAM, and is
controlled by a defendant, then an order requiring a defendant to preserve
and produce such data is not tantamount to ordering the creation of new
data.244
C. Hypothetical Three
Mr. Deets and Newt entered into a business venture together to sell
beef cattle to the United States military. Newt, being what folks call a
“close trader,” took what Mr. Deets believed was more than his fair share
of the profits of a recent sale. Mr. Deets hired a locally renowned cattle
attorney, Mr. Wilbarger, to represent him in a lawsuit against Newt. Mr.
Deets informed Mr. Wilbarger that he was regularly texting with a member
of the military regarding the sale and the pending lawsuit. Mr. Wilbarger
suggested that Mr. Deets stop texting through normal channels and begin
texting only through an ephemeral messaging app. Mr. Wilbarger also
instructed Mr. Deets to delete a public social media post wherein Mr. Deets
bragged about the money he made from the sale in question. Mr. Deets and
Newt eventually settled their dispute to everyone’s satisfaction and are now
much better friends and cattle traders; Mr. Wilbarger’s actions, however,
drew the ire of the court. Eventually, the court issued an order to show

240. Tumlin v. Tuggle Duggins P.A., 15 CVS 9887, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 51, at *24 (N.C.
Super. Ct. May 22 2018).
241. N.C. R. CIV. P. 26, 34.
242. Stathum-Ward v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. COA18-738, 2019 N.C. App. LEXIS
416, *10–12 (N.C. Ct. App. May 7, 2019).
243. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093FMC(JCx), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 46364, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
244. Id.
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cause, requiring Mr. Wilbarger to show the court why he should not be
disciplined for violating the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct.
How should a North Carolina court rule? Based on what we know
from the aforementioned Rules and relevant case law, a North Carolina
court should rule that by suggesting that Mr. Deets use an ephemeral
messaging app and delete relevant social media posts, Mr. Wilbarger
obstructed Newt’s access to discoverable communications in violation of
Rule 3.4 of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct.
Rule 3.4 clearly prohibits lawyers from obstructing an opposing
party’s access to documents by directly obfuscating the evidence or
advising a client to do so.245 The Rule also requires that lawyers make
diligent efforts to obtain and preserve discoverable information and
evidence; by advising his client to use an ephemeral messaging app and thus
cause his messages to be automatically deleted, Mr. Wilbarger did not make
appropriate efforts to protect discoverable evidence and, in fact, took
deliberate steps to obstruct Newt’s access to those communications.246
Finally, by advising Mr. Deets to remove or destroy social media posts that
have evidentiary value in the pending litigation with Newt, Mr. Wilbarer
further violated Rule 3.4.247
VANISHING ACTS AND A BRAVE NEW WORLD: A CONCLUSION
Neil Postman notes that cultures that use tools “may have many tools
or few, may be enthusiastic about tools or contemptuous.”248 But the mere
fact that we use tools sets us apart: it makes us a “tool-using culture.” “The
name ‘tool-using culture’ derives from the relationship in a given culture
between tools and the belief system or ideology. The tools are not intruders.
They are integrated into the culture in ways that do not pose significant
contradictions to its world-view.”249 In other words, the tools our society
creates are not divorced from our culture; they are extensions of it.
What then does this new tool—ephemeral messaging apps—say about
our culture? We have spent far too many words to conclude simply that
such tools are wrong and should not be used; indeed, there are many
contexts, even in litigation, where their use would be far from wrong and
are, in fact, beneficial. For example, an attorney communicating with his

245. N.C. R. OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4 (2020).
246. Id.
247. N.C. State Bar, 2014 Formal Ethics Op. 5 (2015) (advising a civil litigation client
about social media); see also N.C. R. OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4.
248. POSTMAN, supra note 1, at 25.
249. Id.
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client about a pending case may use an ephemeral messaging app with
confidence, knowing that such privileged communications are not being
recorded or saved in some way to be used against his client later. Or
individuals not in litigation or even anticipating litigation may use an
ephemeral messaging app to protect personal conversations, trade secrets,
patented information, or simply mundane conversations they prefer not be
heard or read later by anyone else. In short, the societal and cultural
concerns of privacy and secrecy—the very concerns ephemeral messaging
apps are designed to serve—are legitimate and worth protecting, and
ephemeral messaging apps are a brilliant new tool to accomplish as much.
But litigants and lawyers in North Carolina must use them, like any other
arrow in the litigation quiver, appropriately and in accordance with the
well-established words comprising the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure and the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. Those
words, at least, will not disappear anytime soon.
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